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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to measure how commercial banks from the Visegrad countries are sensitive to crisis confidence 
on the interbank market. We use a stress scenario which simulates a withdrawal of 20% of interbank deposits and measure 
the relative changes of selected liquidity ratios. Banks in all Visegrad countries are sensitive to the crisis confidence on the 
interbank market. Mainly for some Hungarian and Polish banks, this scenario could have fatal consequences and could 
threaten the existence of these banks. In case of Czech and Slovak banks, crisis confidence might have rather secondary 
impacts.  
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1. Introduction 
The fundamental role of banks is to transform short-term deposits into long-term loans. However, because 
of this transformation, banks are exposed to liquidity risk. The insufficient liquidity of a bank may quickly 
spread to the whole banking sector and result in a bank panic. As a result, an interbank market may freeze.  
The aim of this paper is therefore to measure how commercial banks from the Visegrad countries are 
sensitive to crisis confidence on the interbank market. We will use the methodology of the scenario analysis 
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and measure the vulnerability of banks using the stress scenario which will simulate a withdrawal of 20% of 
interbank deposits. 
The structure of the paper is following. Second section defines bank liquidity and its link to the interbank 
market, third section describes methodology and data, fourth section contains results of the scenario analysis 
and last section captures concluding remarks. 
2. Bank liquidity and interbank markets 
Liquidity risk can be defined as the risk that a bank, though solvent, either does not have enough financial 
resources to allow it to meet its obligation as they fall due, or can obtain such funds only at excessive costs 
(Vento and La Ganga, 2009). The bank is able to satisfy the demand for money, and hence is liquid, as long as 
at each point in time outflows of money are smaller or equal to inflows plus the stock of money held by bank. 
If outflows are larger than inflows and the stock of money, there is a deficit. The bank has to find a way how 
to finance it. Depending on the nature, severity and duration of the liquidity shock, BIS (2008) recommends 
banks to identify following alternative sources of funding: deposit growth (more information about legal 
aspects of deposits can be found e.g. in Gongol and Münster, 2013), the lengthening of maturities of liabilities, 
new issues of short- and long-term debt instruments, intra-group fund transfers, new capital issues, the sale of 
subsidiaries or lines of business, asset securitization, the sale of highly liquid assets, drawing-down committed 
facilities and borrowing from the central bank´s marginal lending facilities. Not all of these options may be 
available in all circumstances and some may be available only with a substantial time delay. However, if the 
bank is unable to finance the liquidity shortage, the bank will become illiquid and default. Of course, there is 
also the possibility that the sum of total inflows and the stock of money are larger than outflows. In this case, 
there is no liquidity risk, no borrowing is necessary and the bank can sell the excess liquidity on the market 
(Drehman and Nikolau, 2009). 
The linkages between banks on the interbank market can destabilize the financial system in periods of 
higher liquidity risk. At the beginning, there is a liquidity shock: as a result of imperfect market information 
such as poor solvency of any bank, the liquidity of such bank is threatened. This is the type of idiosyncratic 
liquidity risk which may not significantly harm the banking sector. The problem arises when the risk is 
transferred to several financial institutions and becomes a systemic liquidity risk. This can occur through the 
information channel, the real channel or liquidity hoarding. In case of the information channel, the information 
contagion means sudden and sometimes also unexpected changes in the behavior of economic agents which 
may take the form of herding behavior, information cascades or even sudden reassessment of economic 
fundamentals (Komárková et al., 2012). The real channel appears as a direct knock-on effect from illiquid 
bank to other banks through the financial flows in payment systems or direct linkages between banks (where 
banks hold assets and liabilities of other banks). A failure of one bank can cause the potential reduction of 
liquidity stock on interbank market and thus transfer the liquidity shortage to other banks. Especially in 
periods of higher uncertainty, some illiquid banks may be eliminated from the market. Such banks can then 
either ask the central bank for liquidity support, or they may try to obtain additional liquidity by selling their 
assets (Komárková et al., 2012; Geršl and Komárková, 2009). 
The importance of liquidity risk has been very significantly revised during the global financial crisis. As 
a result of a continued drop in the market value of mortgage-backed securities from the subprime segment of 
the US market and the announcement of problems of some European banks, the interbank market came under 
extreme strain. This confidence crisis had the following consequences: interbank interest rates sharply rose; 
many segments of the structured credit and mortgage market ceased to trade at all, making it difficult to price 
outstanding positions. In some cases, banks failed to raise enough cash through asset sales. As a result of 
liquidity hoarding of some banks, interbank lending become very difficult and for some banks even 
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impossible (Ewerhart and Valla, 2008). In response to the freezing up of the interbank market, the European 
Central Bank, U.S. Federal Reserve and national central banks respond (Černohorský et al., 2010). Even with 
extensive liquidity supports, a number of banks failed, were forced into mergers or required resolution (BIS, 
2009). 
3. Methodology and data 
Scenario analysis is one of the possible tools how to assess bank vulnerability to several liquidity shocks, 
e.g. crisis confidence on the interbank market. Therefore we will describe scenario analysis based on selected 
liquidity ratios in the first part of this section, and then we will focus on data used. 
3.1. Liquidity ratios 
Liquidity ratios are used for liquidity risk measurement and it is a stock-based approach. All items of the 
bank´s balance sheet are divided into liquid assets, illiquid assets, stable liabilities and volatile liabilities. 
These categories are compared against each other in various ways. These ratios reflect the fact that bank 
should be sure that appropriate, low-cost funding is available in a short time. Liquidity ratios can help to 
identify main liquidity trends (Vodová, 2013). Various authors provide various liquidity ratios. For the 
purpose of this paper, we will use following three liquidity ratios: share of liquid assets in total assets, share of 
loans in total assets and share of net interbank position in total assets. 
Share of liquid assets in total assets (LITA) shows which part of the total assets can be readily converted to 
cash. Therefore it should give us information about the general liquidity shock absorption capacity of a bank. 
As a general rule, the higher the share of liquid assets in total assets, the higher the capacity to absorb liquidity 
shock, given that market liquidity is the same for all banks in the sample. Nevertheless, high value of this ratio 
may be also interpreted as inefficiency. Since liquid assets yield lower income liquidity bears high 
opportunity costs for the bank. Therefore it is necessary to optimize the relation between liquidity and 
profitability. Equation (1) shows the principle of calculation of this ratio: 
 %100*
assetstotal
assetsliquidLITA    (1) 
where liquid assets consists from cash, balances with central bank, receivables from credit institutions payable 
on demand and bonds issues by central government and central banks. 
The value of the share of loans in total assets (LOTA) indicates what percentage of the assets of the bank is 
tied up in illiquid loans. The interpretation is therefore opposite than in case of the previous indicator: the 
higher the value of this ratio, the less liquid the bank is. However, too low value of this ratio may indicate that 
the bank does not provide loans sufficiently. This could lower bank profitability. This ratio is calculated as 
follows (2): 
 %100*
assetstotal
loansLOTA    (2) 
The last ratio – share of net interbank position in total assets – relates the net interbank position of a bank 
(i.e. the difference between dues from banks and dues to banks) total assets. We can calculate it with the use 
of equation (3).  
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%100*
assetstotal
bankstoduesbanksfromduesNIP   (3) 
The value of this ratio is positive for net lenders and negative for net borrowers. Comparing with clients´ 
deposits, raising funds in the interbank market is significantly more flexible. But due to the low stability of 
this source of funding (bank is constantly under the control of its counterparties which in case of doubts about 
the financial situation of the bank may not roll over loans), it is more risky. Banks who are net borrowers are 
thus much more vulnerable. 
3.2. Scenario analysis based on liquidity ratios 
Scenario analysis is a category of stress tests which are used to gauge potential vulnerability of financial 
institutions to exceptional, extreme or simply unexpected but plausible events (BIS, 2000). Stress tests for 
liquidity risk are used relatively short time. Liquidity stress test should identify and quantify the potential lack 
of liquidity for specific stress scenario and determine the way how to close this lack at predefined costs. Three 
types of stress scenarios are usually applied: idiosyncratic, market, and combination of both. The idiosyncratic 
scenario typically represents a simulation of an outflow of deposits or a decline in the rating of the bank. The 
market shock usually assumes the decline in the value of certain assets or disturbances in the money or credit 
markets. These two scenarios are accompanied by other macroeconomic shocks, such as the decline in 
economic activity, growth of loans in default or deterioration of the sovereign rating (Komárková et al., 
2012). 
Several central banks and other supervisory authorities have applied stress tests of liquidity, e.g. in 
Netherland (Van den End, 2008), in the Czech Republic (Komárková et al., 2011), in Hong Kong (Wong and 
Hui, 2009) or in Romania (Negrila, 2010). However, their tests are not possible to repeat with publicly 
available information. From this reason, we will focus also on other less complex studies which measured the 
impact of selected scenario (or several different scenarios) on selected liquidity ratios in Austrian (Boss et al., 
2004; Boss et al., 2007), Slovakian (Jurča and Rychtárik, 2006) or Luxembourg (Rychtárik, 2009) banking 
sector. 
Among above cited studies, four studies focused on the crisis confidence on the interbank market. 
Komárková et al. (2011) modeled a liquidity dries up in the money market, as 50% of interbank claims are 
unavailable. Negrila (2010) tested how Romanian banks would react on the sudden drawing of 30% from 
interbank deposits. The impact of crisis confidence on Austrian banks was measured by Boss et al. (2004), 
which simulated a withdrawal of 20% of interbank deposits, and by Boss et al. (2007), by simulation of 
withdrawal of 40% of all interbank short-term funding.   
Based on these studies, we will model a confidence crisis on the interbank market by withdrawal of 20% of 
interbank deposits. This means both the decrease of dues from banks and dues to banks. To measure the 
impact of the crisis confidence on bank liquidity, we will calculate stress values of the liquidity ratios for each 
bank in the sample. Although the decrease of dues from banks would not result to any change of the volume 
of liquid assets, the decrease of dues to banks has to be financed because these debts must be repaid. So while 
calculating the ratio LITA, we have to deduct 20% of dues to banks from liquid assets and from total assets 
(equation 4). When calculating the ratio LOTA, we only change the denominator – total assets (equation 5). 
To obtain the stress value of the ratio NIP, we have to decrease both dues from banks and dues to banks by 
20%. Also the volume of total assets is decreasing (equation 6). 
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%100*banksfromdue*2.0assetstotal
banksfromdue*2.0assetsliquidLITASC 
  (4) 
   %100*banksfromdue*2.0assetstotal
loansLOTASC   (5) 
   
   %100*banksfromdue*2.0assetstotal
bankstodues*8.0banksfromdues*8.0NIPSC 
  (6) 
As a next step, we will compare these stress values to the baseline values of the ratios. The percentage 
change of the values of individual ratios for each bank in the sample and each ratio will be calculated 
according to the equation (7): 
 %100*
R
RRR
iB
iBiSC
i
   (7) 
where Ri is a bank/ratio specific figure i.e. the percentage change of the ratio for the bank and the 
scenario), RiS is the stress value and RiB is the baseline value of all ratios for all banks in the sample. 
Following the methodology of Rychtárik (2009), we will calculate the median values for all liquidity ratios 
and for all banks. The results will show the magnitude of the relative changes between the stress and baseline 
values which will enable us to find out the most vulnerable banks.  
3.3. Data used 
We used unconsolidated balance sheet data on annual basis over the period from 2002 to 2011 which were 
obtained from annual reports of individual banks and from the database BankScope. The data set includes a 
significant part of each analyzed banking sector, not only by the number of banks but also by their share on 
total banking assets (Table 1). Due to the homogeneity of the data set, we include only data of commercial 
banks and we abstract from branches of foreign banks, mortgage banks, building societies and state banks 
with special purpose (such as Českomoravská záruční a rozvojová banka, Slovenská záručná a rozvojová 
banka, Česká exportní banka, Exim banka, Magyar Fejlesztési Bank or Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego). 
Table 1. Data set information. 
 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Czech Republic 
Total number of banks 37 35 35 36 37 37 37 39 41 44 
Number of observed banks 16 16 16 15 13 13 12 12 13 12 
Share on total assets (%) 76 76 74 71 74 74 68 70 70 77 
Hungary 
Total number of banks 39 38 35 34 37 38 36 35 35 35 
Number of observed banks 23 24 26 29 28 27 25 24 21 13 
Share on total assets (%) 84 86 87 88 88 87 88 88 87 83 
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Poland 
Total number of banks 62 60 54 54 51 50 52 49 49 44 
Number of observed banks 28 32 34 35 32 31 32 31 27 19 
Share on total assets (%) 73 88 84 84 82 80 79 79 78 74 
Slovakia 
Total number of banks 20 21 21 23 24 26 26 26 29 31 
Number of observed banks 13 13 13 14 12 12 12 11 10 10 
Share on total assets (%) 54 59 59 65 62 65 69 67 65 66 
 
4. Results and discussion 
The median values of the baseline and stress values of share of liquid assets in total assets (LITA), the 
share of loans in total assets (LOTA) and the share of loans in deposits (LODE) for Czech banks are presented 
in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. (a) LITA for Czech banks (in %); (b) LOTA for Czech banks (in %); (c) NIP for Czech banks (in %). 
As it can be seen from Fig. 1, as a result of the crisis confidence, bank liquidity would decrease in terms of 
all three ratios. A higher value of the LITA ratio signals a better liquidity position of a bank. Lower stressed 
value of this ratio is therefore a signal of a liquidity outflow. Median values of the stressed share of liquid 
assets are positive for the whole analyzed period. This means that in spite of a substantial decrease of 
liquidity, Czech banks on average would be able to finance the withdrawal of 20% of interbank deposits; 
banks that are net borrowers on the interbank market in some years are not exceptions. The LOTA ratio shows 
what percentage of the assets of the bank is tied up in illiquid loans. In terms of liquidity risk, lower values of 
this ratio are more appropriate. The increase of this ratio due to the stress scenario therefore means that crisis 
confidence on the interbank market would reduce bank liquidity. The crisis confidence would also slightly 
lower the net interbank position of banks. Nevertheless, the Czech banking sector as a whole would remain a 
net lender in the interbank market (the median values of the NIP ratio are positive in the whole analyzed 
period). Even in the case of this crisis development, only three banks would be main net borrowers: LLBW 
Bank CZ, Raiffeisenbank and Volksbank. 
Fig. 2 shows impacts of the crisis confidence on selected liquidity indicators for Hungarian banking sector. 
Such liquidity shock would lower bank liquidity quite substantially, especially in the second half of the 
analyzed period. Due to such development, Axa Bank, Banif Plus Bank, Magyar Cetelem Bank, Credigen 
Bank, Porsche Bank, CIB Bank (in 2008-2010) and Sopron Bank (in 2008-2010) would have serious liquidity 
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problems (stressed values of the LITA ratio for these banks are negative). The net interbank position of these 
banks is significantly negative therefore it would be impossible for them to repay suddenly 20% of their 
interbank liabilities. Stressed values of the LOTA ratio are higher than 100% for Banif Plus Bank, Magyar 
Cetelem Bank in 2002-2011, Credigen Bank in 2009-2010, Axa Bank in 2006-2008 and Commerzbank in 
2010 which means that these banks would not be able to handle the crisis confidence in the interbank market. 
As it can be seen from Fig. 2, as a result of the confidence crisis, the net interbank position would be rather 
better. In spite of this, the Hungarian banking sector as a whole would remain in the position of the net 
borrower. However, as we could see from the LITA and LOTA ratios, such stress scenario would be very 
difficult for Hungarian banks. The NIP ratio would not actually improved to its modeled level: many banks 
would not be able to repay 20% of their interbank liabilities because they do not have sufficient buffer of 
liquid assets. Respectively, their buffer of liquid assets is adequate for standard period but not for modeled 
liquidity shocks. This could potentially spill over the liquidity problems to other banks, especially to those that 
are lenders of these banks. 
 
   
Fig. 2. (a) LITA for Hungarian banks (in %); (b) LOTA for Hungarian banks (in %); (c) NIP for Hungarian banks (in %). 
 
Fig. 3. (a) LITA for Polish banks (in %); (b) LOTA for Polish banks (in %); (c) NIP for Polish banks (in %). 
Baseline and stressed values of liquidity ratios for Polish banks are presented in Fig. 3. The fall in median 
of stressed values of the LITA ratio is not as deep, the median values remains positive for the whole analyzed 
period which indicates that the Polish banking sector as a whole is able to maintain sufficient liquidity even in 
such crisis environment. However, some banks would not be able to repay 20% of their interbank liabilities 
during the whole analyzed period (such as Fiat Bank Polska, Mercedes-Benz Bank Polska, RCI Bank Polska 
and Santander Consumer Bank), while some others only in certain years: AIG Bank Polska in 2002-2007, 
Euro Bank in 2009, Kredyt Bank in 2008, SGB Bank in 2008, Toyota Bank Polska in 2003-2006 and 
Volkswagen Bank Polska in 2003-2006. These banks in those years would have negative values of the LITA 
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ratio. It is not surprising that these banks have strongly negative net interbank position, i.e. they are important 
net borrowers. The requirement to pay 20% of their interbank liabilities at once is thus virtually impossible for 
them. In some years, stressed values of the LOTA ratio are higher than 100% for Fiat Bank Polska, RCI Bank 
Polska, Santander Consumer Bank, Toyota Bank Polska and Volkswagen Bank Polska. These banks strongly 
focus on lending activity and at the same time, they use a lot of funds from the interbank market. The impacts 
of the crisis confidence could be therefore fatal for these banks. Similar to Hungarian banks, also in case of 
Polish banks, due to the confidence crisis in the interbank market, accompanied by the 20% decrease of 
interbank assets and liabilities, the NIP ratio would rather increased in most of the analyzed years. 
Nevertheless, the Polish banking sector as a whole would remain net borrower in the interbank market almost 
for the whole analyzed period. However, as it can be seen from the previous ratios, , the confidence crisis in 
the interbank market would be very difficult for Polish banks. It is very probable that, as in case of the 
Hungarian banking sector, the value of the NIP ratio would not increased to the modeled level. The reason is 
that many banks would not be able to repay 20% of their interbank liabilities. This could result in a secondary 
insolvency. The buffer of liquid assets, held by Polish banks, is therefore not adequate for the modeled crisis 
scenario. 
 
  
Fig. 4. (a) LITA for Slovak banks (in %); (b) LOTA for Slovak banks (in %); (c) NIP for Slovak banks (in %). 
Results of the scenario analysis for Slovak banks can be found in Fig. 4. Although it would generate a 
liquidity outflow and it would result in lower value of the LITA ratio, all Slovak banks would remain liquid 
even in case of the confidence crisis in the interbank market. Bank liquidity can be measured also by the 
LOTA ratio. As higher values of this ratio means higher liquidity risk, the values in Fig. 4 shows that crisis 
confidence in the interbank market would affect bank liquidity minimally. Stressed values of this ratio are 
lower than 100% for all banks which means that crisis confidence should not have fatal effects on any of the 
analyzed banks. Finally, the stressed values of the NIP ratio show that as the result of the withdrawal of 20% 
of interbank deposits, the net interbank position would slightly improve in most analyzed years. The Slovak 
banking sector as a whole would remain a net lender until 2007 which is evident from the positive values of 
the NIP ratio. By applying this stress scenario, Slovak banking sector would became a net borrower a year 
earlier, i.e. already in 2006. Even banks which are net borrowers have not such a negative net position as some 
Polish or Hungarian banks. Therefore, Slovak banks are, like the Czech banks, far less vulnerable to market 
turbulence. 
As a next step, we have calculated the percentage changes in the values of the ratios for each bank in the 
sample with the use of equation 7. Based on these values, we have calculated the median values for all ratios 
and all banks. Results are presented in Table 2. 
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                                 Table 2. Severity of the stress scenario. 
Country 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Czech Republic -4.8 -4.6 -5.0 -3.9 -4.2 -7.4 -7.1 -5.0 -4.5 -6.5 
Hungary -5.5 -11 -12 -13 -13 -16 -18 -16 -18 -15 
Poland -12 -11 -9.2 -10 -9.8 -15 -15 -12 -7.3 -15 
Slovakia -4.9 -5.9 -6.5 -8.6 -6.0 -5.1 -6.2 -12 -5.4 -8.6 
 
The severity of the scenario differs significantly in different countries and different years. The crisis 
confidence on the interbank market would have far more important consequences for Hungarian and Polish 
banks. These differences are given mainly by the fact that the Czech banking sector as a whole is a net lender 
for the whole analyzed period and the net interbank position of the Slovak banking sector is very small. The 
requirement to pay 20% of their interbank liabilities would not be a problem for Czech and Slovak banks (in 
contrast to Polish and Hungarian banks). Nevertheless, the confidence crisis in the interbank market could 
have an adverse impact on the liquidity of Czech and Slovak banks: it could worsen the ability of their 
borrowers on the interbank market to meet their obligation. We can also see that banks are more vulnerable in 
crisis years than in the pre-crisis period. 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to measure how commercial banks from the Visegrad countries are sensitive to 
crisis confidence on the interbank market.  
The results of the scenario analysis showed that banks in all Visegrad countries are sensitive to the crisis 
confidence on the interbank market. This scenario would lead to a liquidity outflow. The realization of this 
scenario would have fatal consequences for some banks and could threaten the very existence of the bank, 
especially in crisis years. This is true especially for some Hungarian and Polish banks.  
The different impact of the crisis confidence on the Czech and Slovak banks on the one side and Polish and 
Hungarian banks on the other side is given mainly by the different position of these banking sectors on the 
interbank market. Comparing with Polish and Hungarian banks, the position of Czech and Slovak banks is 
significantly better. Therefore, it would not be a problem to repay 20% of their interbank liabilities for most of 
Czech and Slovak banks. This stress scenario might have rather secondary impact on Czech and Slovak banks 
(in the case that their bank borrowers would not be able to meet their obligations). 
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